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Abstract
During World War I (1914{1918) the birth rate in France fell by 50%. The corre-
sponding decit of births is estimated at 1.4 million, while military losses are estimated
at 1.4 million too. Thus, the fertility decline doubled the demographic impact of the
war. I construct a model of fertility choices where a household faces three shocks in
a war: (i) an increased probability that its wife remains alone after the war; (ii) a
partially-compensated loss of its husband's income; and (iii) a decline in labor produc-
tivity followed by faster growth. I calibrate the model's parameters to the time series of
fertility before the war. I use military casualties and income data to calibrate the war.
The model accounts for 91% of the observed decline, and overpredicts the subsequent
rebound in fertility by 4%. The increased probability of a husband dying is the leading
force behind the results.
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1 Introduction
During the First World War (1914{1918) the birth rate in France declined by about 50%.1
The resulting decit of births, estimated to be 1.4 million, was as large as military losses
estimated to be 1:4 million as well.2 In short, the fertility decline doubled the already large
demographic impact of the war, and its eect on the French demography was noticeable well
into the twentieth century. I oer a quantitative theory to account for this phenomenon.
I develop a model that builds upon Greenwood et al. (2005). The unit of analysis is a
nitely-lived household made of adults and children. The household derives utility from
consumption as well as from the number of children it chooses to have. Children are costly,
though. They require that the wife devotes a fraction of her productive time to them for as
long as they remain in the household. In this model the war matters because the (likely)
death of a husband is a pure, negative (expected) income shock. Since children are normal
goods the war negatively aects fertility.
I propose a quantitative exercise consisting of two steps. First, I calibrate the model to t
the time series of the French fertility rate from 1800 until the eve of World War I. Second,
I use the calibrated model to evaluate the eects of the war on fertility. I model the war
as a change in the environment facing a household along three dimensions: (i) because of
the war there is a non-zero probability that a wife remains alone raising the children; (ii)
there is a partially-compensated loss of a husband's income because of the mobilization;
(iii) there is a decline in productivity, followed by faster growth.
The calibrated model accounts for 91% of the observed fertility decline during the war. The
key determinant of this result is the loss of expected income associated with the risk that a
wife remains alone, that is (i). Other forces, that is (ii) and (iii), are quantitatively relevant
taken one by one, but together they almost oset each others since a drop in earnings for
a wife reduces the opportunity cost of raising children while for the husband it implies a
negative income eect. The model also predicts an increase in fertility (4% more than in
the data) after the war, fueled by a catch-up eect.
This paper contributes to a literature analyzing the consequences of the First World War on
various aspect of the French population. Henry (1966) discusses the consequences of the war
1See Figure 1.
2See Figure 2 for the size of the birth decit. See Huber (1931, p. 413) for military losses. Military losses
include people killed and missing in action. They do not include civilian losses.
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for the marriage market and, more recently, Abramitzky et al. (2011) study the marriage
market to evaluate the impact of the war on assortative matching. The closest studies
are by Festy (1984) and Caldwell (2004). Festy (1984) oers a detailed description of the
decline of fertility during the war. He concludes that \the fertility decline during hostilities
can be seen as a `mechanical' consequence of the impossibility of procreating, rather than a
deliberate attempt to avoid giving birth in such a troubled period."3 In short, Festy's theory
is that feasible fertility declined while desired fertility remained constant. In this paper
I propose a dierent approach: even without a reduction in feasible fertility, how far can
a reduction in desired fertility go in accounting for the actual decline? Caldwell (2004)
examines thirteen social crises, ranging from the English Civil War in the 17th century to
the fall of communism. He documents noticeable falls in fertility in each case, and concludes
that they were mostly temporary adjustments to the uncertainty of the time.4 His results
are consistent with the analysis that I carry out in this paper.
There are other economic theories of fertility beside the one on which I build my model.
Many are reviewed in Jones et al. (2011). A well-known alternative is the so-called \quality-
quantity" tradeo theory proposed by Becker (1960). In these models, increases in wages
induce parents to substitute the quantity of children for higher quality. It is worth noting
that, if there is still a time cost of raising children paid by the wife only, then the eect of
the war on fertility are, qualitatively, the same as in the model presented here. Thus, the
analysis in this paper will carry over to alternative setups.
In the next Section I present statistics relative to the number of births and deaths during
the war as well as to the composition of the Army. I also discuss relevant facts pertaining
to the marriage market and the situation of women during the war. I develop my model
and discuss the determinants of optimal fertility in Section 3. I present the quantitative
analysis and the results in Section 4. I conclude in Section 5.
2 Facts
Some data are from the French census. The last census before the war was in 1911. The
rst census in the post-war era was in 1921. A census was scheduled in 1916 but was
3The quote from Festy is: \La chute de la natalite pendant les hostilites peut donc e^tre vue, par dierence,
comme une consequence `mecanique' de l'impossibilite de s'unir pour procreer, pluto^t que comme une volonte
deliberee d'eviter d'avoir des enfants dans une periode aussi troublee." (Festy, 1984, page 1003).
4See Table 1.
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cancelled. This data, and the data from previous censuses, were systematically organized in
the 1980s and made available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR). It is also available from the French National Institute for Statistics and
Economic Studies (Insee). Vital statistics are available during the war years for the 77
regions (departements) not occupied by the Germans. There was a total of 87 regions in
France at the beginning of the war. Huber (1931) provides a wealth of data on the french
population before, during and after the war. It also contains a useful set of income-related
data.
2.1 Births and Deaths
The rst month of World War I was August 1914, but the rst reduction in the number of
live births occurred nine months later: it dropped from 46,450 in April 1915 to 29,042 in
May {a 37% decline.5 During the course of the war the minimum was attained in November
1915 when 21,047 live births were registered. The pre-war level of births was reached again
in December 1919. To put these numbers in perspective consider Figure 2, which shows the
number of births per month in France and Germany. For France, the dierence between
the actual number of births and the trend, summed between May 1915 (9 months after the
declaration of war) and August 1919 (9 months after the armistice), yields an estimated 1.4
million children not born. This gure amounts to 3.5% of the French population in 1914
(40 million) and is comparable to the military losses of the war: 1.4 million. The estimate
for Germany is 3.2 million children not born. It amounts to 5% of the German population
in 1911 (65 million) and exceeds the number of military deaths estimated at 2 million.6
Similar calculations, made by demographers, lead to comparable gures: Vincent (1946,
p. 431) reports a decit of 1.6 million French births and Festy (1984, p. 979) reports 1.4
million.7
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show changes in contemporaneous fertility. They are silent about the
long-term eects of the war. I discuss these eects now. I rst show that the lifetime fertility
of the generations aected by the war declined. Second, I show that the war changed the
age-structure of the French population for the rest of the twentieth century.
5See Bunle (1954, Table XI, p. 309).
6See Huber (1931, pp. 7 and 449).
7Another statistic of interest can be computed with the trend lines of Figure 2. The realized number of
births between May 1915 and August 1919 was 52% of the expected number in France, and 57% in Germany.
4
1. Figure 3 shows completed fertility, a measure of realized lifetime fertility. Its main
message is that the women who reached their twenties during the First World War
gave birth, throughout their lives, to less children than the generations that preceded
or followed them. Thus, even though there exist some evidence that women post-
poned their births until after the war was over (see Section 2.3), they did not fully
compensate the forgone births of the war. If they had, their completed fertility would
have remained unaected by the war since one less child today would be made up for
by one more child later on. Vincent (1946) argues that about half of the decit of
births during the war was compensated by the post-war rebound.
2. Figure 4 shows the age and sex structure of the French population at chosen dates.
The dierences between the pre- and post-war periods are noticeable. The 1930 panel
shows a decit of men (relative to women) in the 30-50 age group. These are the
men that died during the war. There is also a decit of both men and women in the
teens. This is the generation that should have been born during the war but was not
because of the fertility decline. The 1950 panel shows again the same phenomenon 20
years later. The men who died at war should have been in the 50-70 age group, and
the generation not born during the war should have been in its thirties. Note also
the decit of births that occurred in the early 1940s, that is during World War II.
What caused this? It could have been that, as during World War I, fertility declined.
For the French, however, the impact of World War II was quite dierent than that
of World War I, possibly because the ghting did not last as long. In fact, the birth
rate in the 1940s shows a noticeable increase.8 Thus, births were low in the 1940s
because the generation that was in its childbearing period at that moment, e.g. of
age 25 in 1940, was born in and around World War I. This generation was unusually
small, so it gave birth to unusually little children despite a high birth rate. Thus, the
decit of births during World War I lead, mechanically, to another decit 25 years
later because of a reduction in the size of the fertile population.
Figure 5 shows the age and sex structure of the populations of Germany, Belgium, Italy as
well as Europe as a whole and the United States in 1950. All European countries exhibit
a decit of births during the war which, as is the case for France, is still noticeable in the
1950 population. The United States, on the contrary, were not noticeably aected by World
8One can argue that the baby boom was already under way in the early 1940s in France. Greenwood et
al. (2005) propose of theory of the baby boom based on technical progress in the household that is consistent
with this view.
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War I. The United Kingdom appears to have experienced a reduced decit of births during
World War I compared with other European countries.
2.2 The Mobilization
The mobilization was massive. A total of 8.5 million men served in the French army over
the course of the war, while the size of the 20-50 male population is estimated at 8.7 million
on January 1st 1914. Thus, almost all men served at some point during the war. In the
model of Section 3 I use this observation to justify the assumption that all men serve in
war.
The majority of soldiers were mobilized, that is they were called to serve and had to report
to military centers of incorporation. Huber (1931, p. 94) reports that a small, albeit not
negligible, number of men (229,000 men) volunteered into the army between 1914 and 1919.
Those men chose to serve even though, at the time they did, they were not compelled to
do so by law. On August 1st 1914, the day of the mobilization, the army counted already
1 million men. The remaining 7.5 million were incorporated throughout the four years of
the war.9 Throughout the war the army regularly reviewed cases of men exempted from
military duty for whatever reason, and called large proportions of them to serve.
How feasible was it for mobilized men to conceive a child? It is dicult to answer this
question with existing data. Being mobilized did not imply that a man was on the front
line continuously. At any point in the war, 30 to 50% of mobilized men were in the rear.
These men were serving in factories, public administrations and in the elds to help with
the production of food for the troops and the population.10 In addition, leaves for the
combat troop became more generous, albeit still short, from June 1915 onward.
I propose a simple accounting exercise to try and gauge the relative importance of the
\feasible" fertility approach of Festy (1984) and the \desired" fertility approach of this
paper. Let c denote the number of couples with a physical opportunity to conceive a child.
Let b denote the desired number of births for a couple. The former is exogenous while the
latter is a choice. The fertility rate is
f =
number of births
number of fertile women
=
c b
number of fertile women
:
9See Huber (1931, p. 89).
10See Huber (1931, p. 105).
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I assume that the denominator is not aected by the war. I also assume, in line with the
\feasible" fertility approach, that b is constant. Then, to account for the 50% decline in
fertility during the war c needs to decline by 50%. After the war, however, c is less than
before since 84% of the men that served survived. Thus, both the rate of fertility and
the total number of births at the end of the war should be 84% of their pre-war level.11
They were, in fact, higher {see Figure 1 and Figure 2. The lesson from this exercise is that
changes in both the exogenous opportunity to conceive and fertility decisions are likely to
have played a role. This paper evaluates the eect of the war on fertility choices only.
2.3 The Women
I present a set of facts related to the situation of women. There are (i) evidence suggesting
that some women postponed births; (ii) evidence suggesting that the marriage market was
disrupted but that out-of-wedlock births increased; (iii) evidence suggesting that women's
labor force participation did not change dramatically.
1. Figure 6 shows that the age of women giving birth increased during and after the
war. This observation suggests that young women postpone giving birth during the
war and caught-up later, while slightly older themselves. In the model of Section 3 a
household has the option to exploit a similar margin to smooth the cost of the war.
2. Henry (1966) shows that the marriage market was noticeably perturbed for the gener-
ations reaching their marriage and childbearing years during the war. Many marriages
were postponed. After 1918, women married men of their age or younger more than
they usually did, because the men they would have normally married were dead. In-
terestingly, however, the spinster rate at age 50 for women that should have married
during the war diers little than that of other generations.12 Note, however, that from
the perspective of a woman during the war, marriages prospects in the aftermath of
the war may have appeared quite uncertain. Finally, note that the disruption in the
marriage market does not imply that births are aected. Although it is common, it is
not necessary to be married to have children. Figure 7 shows that the proportion of
11I assume here, as in the model of Section 3, that all men were in a couple when the war broke out, and
that if they do not survive the \couple" becomes sterile.
12Henry (1966) reports that the proportion of single women, at the age of 50, for the 1891-1895 generation
is 12.5%, and that for the 1896-1900 generation it is 11.9%. These gures compare with similar gures for
generations whose marriage decisions were not aected by the war such as the 1851-1855 generation: 11.2%,
or the 1856-1860 generation: 11.3%.
7
out-of-wedlock births increased signicantly during the war. In the model of Section
3 I abstract from the marriage market. In light of the evidence just presented, this
seems a reasonable abstraction.
3. Little information is available on female labor during the war. Robert (2005) reports
that the best information available is from seven surveys conducted by work inspec-
tors. These surveys did not cover all branches of the economy such as railways and
state-owned rms. However, data are available for 40,000 to 50,000 establishments
in food, chemicals, textile, book production, clothing, leather, wood, building, met-
alwork, transport and commerce. These establishments employed about 1.5 million
workers before the war: about a quarter of the labor force in industry and commerce.
Robert (2005, Table 9.1) reports that the share of women worker was 30% in July 1914
and peaked in January 1915 at 38.2%. It then declined slowly throughout the war and
during the following years. It was 32% in July 1920. Downs (1995) and Schweitzer
(2002) emphasize that the increase in women's participation was moderated by the
fact that between 80 and 95% of the women who worked during the war were already
working before: \In the popular imagination, working women had stepped from do-
mestic obscurity to the center of production, and into the most traditionally male of
industries. In truth, the war brought thousands of women from the obscurity of ill-paid
and ill-regulated works as domestic servant, weavers and dressmakers into the brief
limelight of weapons production." (Downs, 1995, page 48) In the model of Section 3
a woman's labor is exogenous which, in light of the evidence just presented, seems a
reasonable abstraction.
3 The Model
I start by describing the benchmark model in Section 3.1. The benchmark model describes
an economy at peace, but most of the intuition needed to understand the eect of an
unexpected war can be grasped from it. In Section 3.2 I introduce the war explicitly into
the model, to lay out the framework for the quantitative analysis of Section 4.
3.1 The Benchmark Model
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals whose lives are made
of two stages: childhood and adulthood. Children are born into households headed by two
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adults and, each period, a fraction 1    of them leave.13 The assumption that children
remain in the household for some time after their birth is relevant for the quantitative
exercise of Section 4 since, all else equal, children are costlier when they stay longer.
After leaving the household children become age-1 adults and pair with other age-1 adults
to form new households. The household formation process is exogenous. Households live
for J periods and are the only decision makers.
The Preferences
A household's preferences are dened over streams of consumption and the number of
children present. They are represented, for generation  , by the utility function
JX
j=1
j 1

U

cj;
(nj; + bj; ; 2)

+ V (nj; + bj; )

;
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor. Total household con-
sumption at age j is denoted cj; . The number of children present at age j comprises
children already born and still in the household, denoted by nj; , and newborn of the pe-
riod, denoted by bj; . The function (; 2) is an adult-equivalent scale where 2 denotes the
number of adults. The parameter  is positive and U and V are concave, twice-continuously
dierentiable utility indexes. I assume
U(x) =
x1 
1   and V (x) =
x1 
1  ;
with ;  > 0.
I assume that a household values consumption per (adult equivalent) member, instead of
total consumption, to account for a mitigating eect of the war on the cost of children.
Namely, when a husband dies, all else equal, consumption per member increases and its
marginal utility decreases. Hence, allocating resources toward raising children becomes
cheaper. Note the assumption that children are perfect substitute regardless of their age.
This is for simplicity.
13After J periods all remaining children leave.
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The Timing of Fertility
A household chooses how many children to give birth to at age 1 and 2, that is b1; and b2; .
From age 2 onward it is \sterile," that is bj; = 0 for j > 2. I model the timing of births
because it may be quantitatively important in light of the evidence, presented in Section
2.3, that some women postponed giving births until after the war was over. Not modeling
this margin would exaggerate the cost of the war for a household who could give birth only
during the war. In Section 4 I assume that the war lasts for one model-period, and even
though its duration is uncertain from the perspective of a household, there is the option to
delay fertility and have children later.
The Allocation of Time and Income
Adults are endowed with one unit of productive time per period. A husband supplies his
time inelastically while a wife allocates hers between raising children and working. A child
requires  units of a wife's time for each period during which it is present in the household.
The parameter  represents technology. It is not a control variable. Instead, a wife's time
allocation is indirectly controlled through the number of children she gives birth to.
Wage rates are gender specic. Let wit, i = m; f denote the wage rate for husbands and
wives, respectively. I assume that both wages grow at the constant (gross) rate g > 1 each
period: wit+1 = gw
i
t: Given these specications, the labor income of an age-j household of
generation  with nj; children already born and present, and bj; newborn is
wm+j 1 + w
f
+j 1   wf+j 1(nj; + bj; ):
Beside labor income, I also assume that a household has access to a one-period, risk-free
bond with (gross) rate of interest 1=. It can freely borrow and lend any amount at this
rate.
The Optimization
It is convenient to describe the optimization problem of a household recursively. Let
Wj; (a; n) denote the value of an age-j household of generation  with assets a and n
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children already born. Then,
Wj; (a; n) = max
c;a0;b
U

c
(n+ b; 2)

+ V (n+ b) + Wj+1;
 
a0; n0

(1)
subject to
c+ a0 + wf+j 1(nj; + bj; ) = w
m
+j 1 + w
f
+j 1 +
a

(2)
n0 = (n+ b) (3)
Equation (2) is the budget constraint. Equation (3) describes the number of children that
remain in the household next period: a fraction  of them. The following additional restric-
tions are also imposed: b = 0 for j > 2 since the household is fecund only at age 1 and 2; a
and n are both zero at age 1 since the household is born without assets nor children; a0 = 0
when j = J since the household cannot save/borrow during the last period of its life.
The rst order conditions for consumption and savings imply the Euler condition
U1

c
(n+ b; 2)

1
(n+ b; 2)
= U1

c0
(n0 + b0; 2)

1
(n0 + b0; 2)
; (4)
while the rst order conditions for consumption and fertility (at age j = 1; 2) can be
rearranged into
V1(n+ b) + Wj+1;;2(a
0; n0) =
U1

c
(n+ b; 2)

1
(n+ b; 2)

wf+j 1 +
c
(n+ b; 2)
1(n+ b; 2)

: (5)
For the sake of exposition consider the special case where  = 0, and (n+ b; 2) = 1. Then
Equation (5) reads
V1(n+ b) = U1 (c) w
f
+j 1; (6)
stipulating that at an optimum the marginal rate of substitution between children and
consumption equals the relative price of children. Most of the qualitative properties of
fertility in the model can be grasped from an inspection of Equation (6). This is because
by assuming  = 0 and (n+ b; 2) = 1, I abstract from two features of the model designed
to quantitatively assess the war, but having no bearings on the qualitative properties of the
model. These features are the assumption that children remain in the household for some
periods after they are born; and the assumption that the household values consumption per
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member.
Equation (6) shows how the model is able to replicate the secular decline in fertility before
the war. As wages and consumption increase, fertility increases or decreases depending
upon the relative magnitudes of the income and substitution eects. Note that changes in
a husband's wage imply only an income eect while for the wife there are both income and
substitution eects. For fertility to decrease, the substitution eect must dominate.
Equation (6) also helps to understand two eects of a war: the contemporaneous drop in
fertility and the post-war catch-up. To see this, I assimilate a war to a negative income
shock that lowers consumption and, therefore, raises the marginal cost of children. This
implies a drop in fertility as illustrated in Figure 8. Such low fertility implies that, in the
period following a war, a still-fertile household has a low stock n of children. Thus, the
marginal utility of children is high and fertility increases. This is illustrated in Figure 9.
There are dierences between Equation (5) and Equation (6), though. This is because
children remain in the household beyond the period of their birth, yielding utility and
being costly at the same time. The net, present value of these eects is measured in
Equation (5) by the term Wj+1;;2(a
0; n0). Another dierence between Equations (5) and
(6) pertains to the right-hand side. Since a household values consumption per member it
is the marginal utility of consumption per member that measures the cost of resources,
hence the term U1(c=(n + b; 2))=(n + b; 2). In addition a newborn requires a share of
consumption, hence the term c=(n+ b; 2) 1(n+ b; 2).
To sum up, the eects discussed above are at the core of the model's ability to generate a
downward trend in fertility punctuated by a negative response of fertility to the war, and a
rebound in the period following the war.
3.2 The War and its Aftermath
In this section I introduce, formally, the notion of a war in the model. This is important for
the quantitative exercise of Section 4. As will transpire later, the size of the income eect
associated with the war is determined, to a large extent, by the likelihood of a husband
dying in war. This section introduces the apparatus for this discussion.
I start by dening !t 2 fpeace,warg to denote the state of the world. I also dene zj; 2
f1; 2g as the number of adults in an age-j household. Both !t and zj; are random variables.
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Their realizations are observed at the beginning a period, before any decisions are made.
I make the following assumptions about the distribution of !t and zj; . In peace, a war is
not anticipated. In war, the probability of peace next period is denoted by q. In peace, the
number of adults in a household is constant. In war the probability of a husband dying is
denoted by p. I abstract from the possibility of remarriage, i.e. zj; = 1 is an absorbing
state. Finally, I maintain the assumption that z1; = 2, that is a newly-formed household
comprises two adults.
A household's optimization problem writes now
Wj; (a; n; z; !) = max
c;a0;b
U

c
(n+ b; z)

+ V (n+ b) + E

Wj+1;
 
a0; n0; z0; !0

; (7)
subject to
c+ a0 + wf+j 1(!)(nj; + bj; ) =
(
wm+j 1(!) + w
f
+j 1(!) + a= z = 2
wf+j 1(!) + a= z = 1
(8)
where E is the expectation operator. The problem is subject to the additional restriction
that a 1-adult household cannot have children. Note that if there is a war in the current
period and the husband survives it, the probability that he does not survives the next period
is (1  q)p.
I complete the problem with a description of the relationship between wages and the state
of the world: wit(!). I assume, that wages drop by a proportion 
i during the war, remain
constant as long as the war continues, and grow at the constant rate gpost war > g when
peace returns. Formally
wit+1 (peace) = w
i
t (peace)
(
g before the war
gpost war after the war
(9)
in peace, and
wit(war) =
 
1  i wilast period before war (10)
wit+1(peace) = gpost war  wit(war) (11)
in war. Note that, in peace, the probability of a war is zero. So there is no denition for
wit(war) in peace time.
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This optimization problem subsumes the benchmark model as a special case. Namely, if a
war never occurs the choices of any generation of households are the same as they would be
in the benchmark model. This derives immediately from the assumption that households
do not anticipate a war and that the number of adults in a household remains constant in
peace time.
The rst order conditions are similar to that of the benchmark model. For fertility, this is
true only for households with two adults since I assume that a 1-adult household cannot
have children. The rst order condition for bj; becomes
V1(n+ b) + E[Wj+1;;2(a
0; n0;m0!0)] =
U1

c
(n+ b; 2)

1
(n+ b; 2)

wf+j 1(!) +
c
(n+ b; 2)
1(n+ b; 2)

(12)
for j = 1; 2. The interpretation of Equation (12) is similar to that of Equation (5).
I describe now the eects of p, q, i and gpost war. An increase in p, the probability of a
husband dying in war amounts to a negative expected income shock. The household reduces
its consumption, and, as discussed in Section 3.1, this leads to a decrease in fertility. A
decrease in q, the probability of peace next period, acts in a similar way since it makes it
more likely that the husband will die, if not in this period in the next. Note, however that a
decrease in q also makes it less likely for the household to be able to postpone giving birth
until peace returns. Thus q has ambiguous eects on fertility. The parameter m yields
a contemporaneous, negative income eect. The parameter f yields contemporaneous
income and substitution eects. The eect of faster growth after the war, gpost war, depends
also on income and substitution eects. Consider the (empirically relevant) case where the
substitution eect dominates. Then households are induced to have children earlier. This
dampens the fertility decline during the war.
4 Quantitative Analysis
4.1 Calibration of the Benchmark Model
In this section I calibrate the model to pre-World War I data for France. I treat this period
as being without wars. Several of the model's parameters are chosen a priori. Others are
chosen to minimize the distance between actual and predicted fertility.
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A period in the model corresponds to 5 years in the data. Thus, an age-1 individual in the
model corresponds to a child between the age of 0 and 5 in the data. I choose  so that the
expected duration of childhood is 4 periods.14 This choice implies  = 0:80. Households
live for J = 7 periods.
I let the rate of interest on the risk free asset be 4% per year. This implies a subjective
discount factor  = 1:04 5. I use the rate of growth of the Gross National Product per
capita in the 19th century, 1:6% per year, for the growth rate of wages.15 This implies
g = 1:0165. I normalize the initial condition (corresponding to 1806 in the data) for wm to
1 and I assume a constant gender gap in wages: wf=wm. Huber (1931, pp. 932-935) reports
gures for the daily wages of men and women in agriculture, industry and commerce in
1913. In industry, a woman's wage in 1913 was 52% of a man's. In agriculture the gap was
64%, and in commerce it was 77%. Since commerce was noticeably smaller than agriculture
and industry I use wf=wm = 0:6. In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to
wf=wm.
For , the adult-equivalent scale, I use the \OECD-modied equivalence scale" which assigns
a value of 1 to the rst adult member in a household, 0.5 to the second adult and 0.3 to
each child:
(n;m) =
1
2
+
m
2
+ 0:3n:
I now turn to the remaining parameters,   (; ; ; ). I construct a time series of the
French fertility rate using the birth rate and the proportion of women between the age of
15 and 44 from Mitchell (1998). Let ft denote this data. I compute model fertility as an
equally-weighted average of the fertility of age-1 and age-2 women at date t:
ft() =
b1;t() + b2;t 1()
2
:
I adopt this specication for simplicity. Actual fertility is, in fact, weighted by the relative
size of each generation. French data show these weights to be remarkably stable about
50% in the 19th century.16 In the model, however, declining fertility implies counterfactual
predictions for the growth rate and age-composition of the population, unless exogenous
14The probability that a children remains in the household for one more period is  until age 6. At age 7
this probability is 0. Hence the expected duration of childhood is
P6
j=1 j
j 1(1  ) + 76:
15see Carre et al. (1976, Tables 1.1 and 2.3).
16Mitchell (1998, Table A2) reports data showing that the ratio of women aged 25-29 to women aged
20-29, for example, is remarkably stable, about 50%, between 1851 and 1911. The same results hold for the
30-34 group relative to the 25-34 and other groups.
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trends in life expectancy and possibly migration are taken into account.17 Such additions
would be orthogonal to the issue being studied. Thus, using the observed weights of 50%
appears to be a reasonable simplication that is also consistent with the data. Formally, I
solve the following minimization problem:
min

X
t2I
[ft()  ft]2 + [(b1;1906() + b2;1906())  0:1]2 (13)
where I is an index set: I = f1806; 1811; 1816; : : : ; 1906g. The second part of the objective
function is the distance between the time spent by the 1906 generation raising its children
and its empirical counterpart, 10%. The latter gure comes from Aguiar and Hurst (2007,
Table II). They report that in the 1960s a woman in the U.S. spends close to 6 hours per
week on various aspect of childcare, that is primary, educational and recreational. This
amounts to 10% of the sum of market work, non-market work and childcare (61 hours).
Thus,  is set to imply that the time spent by a women on childcare, on the eve of the war,
is 10% as well. In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to the target gure
for the time cost of raising children.
I motivate this calibration as follows. The model predicts a decline in fertility only if the
income eect of wages is dominated by the substitution eect (see Section 3). Thus, the
downward trend in the times series of fertility restricts the size of the income eect on
fertility. The logic of the experiment that I propose is to use this discipline to assess the
eect of a particular income shock: the war.
The calibrated parameters are displayed in Table 2. Figure 11 displays the computed and
actual fertility rate for the pre-war period. Note that, by construction, the parameters of the
model imply an elasticity of fertility to income of ln(100=160)= ln
 
1:016100

=  0:28, since
fertility declines from about 160 to 100 in the century before the war. This gure is within
17Let pj; denote the age-j adult population of generation  . Assuming that children become adults in
one period implies that the age-1 adults of generation  + 1 are born from age-1 and age-2 adults in the
previous period. That is from generation  and    1. Thus, p1;+1 = p1;b1; + p2; 1b2; 1. Dividing by
p1; yields
p1;+1
p1;
= b1; +
p2; 1
p1;
b2; 1:
Note the terms p1;+1=p1; and p2; 1=p1; . The rst is the growth rate of population, namely the growth
rate of the age-1 adult cohort. The second is the old-to-young adult ratio at date  . In the french data
both terms are constant in the 19th century, while b1; and b2; 1, decrease. The equation above is then
inconsistent with this observation. In other words, the model cannot t at the same time the decline in
fertility, the constant growth rate of population, and its age composition, without additional determinants
of population dynamics.
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the range of estimates centered around minus one-third reported by Jones et al. (2011,
Table 1) for cross-sectional data in the United States. Unfortunately, although there exist
detailed fertility statistics by regions for France during the 19th century, no cross-sectional
income statistics are available.
4.2 Baseline Experiment
Parameters Representing the War
I assume that the war breaks out in 1916 and lasts for one single period. That is, the
realized values of ! are !t = peace for all t 6= 1916, and !1916 = war. I consider three values
for the probability that the war ends after one period: q 2 f1:0; 0:9; 0:8g.
I calibrate p, the probability that a wife is alone after one period of war as
p =
military losses of World War I
total men mobilized
:
There were 1.4 million military losses and 8:5 million men were mobilized. This implies
p = 1:4=8:5 = 0:16. This gure is not perfect. On the one hand it may exaggerate the risk
for a wife since remarrying was possible. On the other hand it may underestimate the risk
since not all mobilized men were exposed to combats. Also, a husband may survive the war
but come home disabled.18 In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to p to
address these concerns.
I now turn to the calibration of m, f and and gpost war. Figure 10 shows a 30% decline of
output per worker in France between 1913 and 1919, followed by an annual rate of growth of
2.5% from 1919 to 1930. Thus, I use f = 0:3 to represent the drop in productivity of a wife,
and gpost war = 1:025
5: When a man is mobilized he does not work, so the husband's wage
is interpreted as a transfer to the household with a mobilized husband { a compensation.
Downs (1995) reports compensations amounting to somewhere between 35 and 60% of a
man's pre-war salary in agriculture or industry.19 I use m = 0:5.
18In the case of World War I this was a distinct possibility since the massive use of artillery and gases
made this conict quite dierent from any other conict before. Huber (1931, p. 448) reports 4.2 million
wounded during the war: half of the men mobilized. The number of invalid was 1.1 million among which
130,000 were mutilated and 60,000 were amputated.
19See Downs (1995, p. 49) and Huber (1931, pp. 932-935).
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Discussion of Results
The main results of this experiment are three-fold. Fertility decreases noticeably during the
war because all fertile households choose to have less children. Once the war is over, that
is in 1921 in the model, there is a rebound in fertility because the households that are still
fertile catch-up. Finally, lifetime fertility is reduced for the generations exposed to the war
during their fertile years.
I now describe these results in more details for the case of q = 1, that is when households
expect the war to last only one period. Figure 12 shows the time path of fertility. Table
3 summarizes the results. In 1916, the fertility rate predicted by the model falls by 45%
relative to 1911, versus a 49% fall in the data. Thus, the model accounts for 91% of the
data (45=49 = 0:91).
In 1921 fertility is 123% above its 1916 value in the model. The corresponding gure in
the data is 118%. Thus, the model over predicts by 4% the post-war increase. To interpret
this result Figure 13 plots fertility by age, conditional on a husband being in the household.
Households without husbands have zero fertility. Consider rst the 1911 cohort. In 1911 it
is age 1 and does not anticipate the war. So its age-1 fertility is on trend. In 1916 it is age
2. There is a stock of already-born children but the war is on. It is then forced to reduce
its fertility to bear the cost of the already existing children.
Consider now the 1916 cohort. It reduces its age-1 fertility in 1916 because its current and
expected income is low. In 1921, if the husband survives, its fertility does not return to trend,
though. It is above trend because the stock of children in the household is \abnormally"
low and therefore the marginal utility of children is high. Hence fertility is high as well.
Note that this eect is mitigated in overall fertility since a fraction p of husbands in this
generation died. Indeed, overall fertility for 1921 is computed as
b1;1921 + (1  p)b2;1916
2
:
It transpires from the results that the eect of p is dominated by the increase in b2;1916.
Figure 14 shows lifetime fertility by cohort. That is, for cohort  , the gure plots b1; + b2;
(multiplied by 5 since a model-period is 5 years). Two points are worth mentioning. The
1911 cohort reduces its lifetime fertility the most. This is because, even though it has
trend fertility at age 1, it is forced to reduce its fertility noticeably at age 2. The 1916
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cohort reduces its lifetime fertility, but less. This is because the decrease during the war is
compensated by the increase in 1921.
I now make a few additional observations about the results. First, Table 3 shows cases
where households expect that the war continues with some probability, that is q < 1. The
results are relatively close to those discussed here. This is because there are two osetting
eects of a decrease in q. On the one hand, a decrease in q magnies the risk associated
with the war and, therefore, exacerbates the fertility adjustment. On the other hand, when
a young household expects the war to be over in the next period it has an incentive to
reallocate births into the future. This incentive is weakened by increases in the probability
that, in the future, the war can still be on. Second, post war fertility is briey above
trend because productivity is still below trend immediately after the war. Post war fertility,
however, declines fast because of the faster growth rate in productivity. Third, Figure 13
shows that age-1 households have above-trend fertility after the war, while age-2 households
have below trend fertility. This results from faster growth again: future children appear
relatively costlier to post-war generations than to pre-war generations. Hence the shift of
births toward younger age.
4.3 Decomposition
To evaluate the contributions of the various components of the war I conduct a set of 4 exper-
iments. Remember that the war is represented by four parameters:  = (p; m; f ; gpost war)
in addition to q, the probability that peace returns next period. In the rst experiment I
consider  = (p; 0; 0; g) so that the only eect of the war is that husbands may die. There
are no eects on productivity. In the second experiment  = (0; m; 0; g) so that the only
eect of the war is to reduce the husband's wage. In the third experiment  = (0; 0; f ; g) so
that the only eect of the war is to reduce the wife's wage. In the third  = (0; 0; 0; gpost war)
so that the war only accelerates growth.
Table 3 and Figure 15 show the results of these experiments. The key nding, here, is
that the shock to expectations (Experiment 1) is necessary to understand, quantitatively,
the eect of the war on fertility. As the table shows, when the war implies only a shock
to expectations, the decline in fertility accounts for 100% of the decline in the baseline
experiment. The increase after the war accounts for 79% of the increase in the baseline
experiment. This result does not imply that other shocks are quantitatively irrelevant in
their own rights. What transpires from experiment 2, 3 and 4, however, is that the various
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shocks to productivity tend to oset each others.
The eects of m and f on fertility are relatively simple to interpret. The shock to m
(Experiment 2) is a temporary, negative income shock. Quantitatively, it accounts for 42%
of the decline in fertility in the baseline experiment. The shock to f (Experiment 3)
implies both income and substitution eects with the latter dominating, as is implied by
the calibration strategy adopted in Section 4.1. Thus, its eect is to increase fertility by
12% during the war.
The growth rate gpost war (Experiment 4), on its own, tends to raise fertility during the
war and to reduce it in 1921. This is because an increase in the growth rate raises the
cost of having children late in life. Thus, in 1916 when steeper wage proles are expected,
age-1 households increase their current fertility at the expense of their age-2 fertility. In an
experiment were gpost war = g but all the other shocks are as in the baseline experiment,
that is  = (p; m; f ; g), I nd that that the model account for 94% of the decline during
the war and over predicts the post-war increase by 5%. In this experiment, unlike in the
baseline, the post-war fertility of both age-1 and age-2 households are above their pre-war
trends. In sum, even though the growth rate of wages matter for the timing of fertility, its
eect on overall fertility are quantitatively smaller than that of other variables.
Noe, to conclude, that despite the fact that the shock to expectations is the main driver of
the results, changes to expected household income is not enough to predict the eect of the
war on fertility. In the baseline experiment, the expected income of an age-1 household in
1916 is 45% less than it would have been if the war had not broken out. In experiment 1,
which yields a similar response of fertility, the household's expected income only drops by
about 8%. The reason for this is that changes to the household's expected income in the
baseline experiment masks mutually osetting eects that are absent in Experiment 1.
4.4 Sensitivity
I consider alternative values for (i) the probability that a woman remains alone after the
war, p; (ii) the magnitude of the husband's income loss during the war, m; (iii) the time
cost of raising children, ; and (iv) the gender wage gap in earnings, wf=wm. Table 4 reports
the results of this analysis for the case where q = 0. The main lesson to take away from
this exercise is that even with noticeable changes in parameters' value, the model generates
sizeable changes in fertility during and after the war.
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Setting the probability that a woman is alone after the war to 10% instead of the baseline
value of 16% yields a 33% decline in fertility. This accounts for 67% of the actual decline
instead of 91% in the baseline. An interpretation of this experiment is that it is an indirect
way of accounting for the remarriage option that war widows had but that the model
abstracts from. When p = 20%, the decline in fertility is more pronounced than in the
baseline: 49%. Turning to m: when m = 0:75 instead of the baseline value of 50%, a
household receives only a quarter of it's husband pre-war income as a compensation during
the war. This exacerbates the eect of the war: fertility decline by 53%, over predicting the
actual decline by 8%. When m = 0:25, the decline in fertility is 42%. It is interesting to
note that the results are more sensitive to changes in p than m: a change in p by a factor
of 2 yields a 50% increase in the fertility decline predicted by the model. Changing m by
a factor of 3 yields a 26% dierence in the results. This is a reassuring result since m is a
parameter that is dicult to gauge, the only source I used being Downs (1995).
Finally, I note that in the experiments where the gender wage gap and the time cost of a
child dier from the baseline, the model is recalibrated to the time series of fertility. It may
appear \counter-intuitive" that the eect of the war on fertility is not exacerbated when
the cost of a child is larger than in the baseline, e.g., when it is 15% instead of 10%. The
reason for this result is that, as the target gure for the time cost of a child changes, other
parameters change too. In particular, a larger-than-baseline time cost of children implies
a higher value for : This can be understood as follows: as the opportunity cost of raising
a child increases the marginal cost increases too. Since the model is calibrated to t the
fertility data, marginal cost and marginal benet must be equalized at the same fertility
level. This implies that the marginal benet of a child must also increase, which is achieve
through higher values for  and . Thus, on the one hand households have an incentive to
reduce fertility more than in the baseline during a war because children are costlier, but
on the other hand, since the marginal utility of a child is higher reducing fertility is also
costlier than in the baseline. These two opposing eects almost oset each others when the
time cost of raising a child is 15%.
5 Conclusion
The human losses of World War I were not only on the battleeld. In France, the number of
children not born during the war was as large as military casualties. This aected the age
composition of the French population for the rest of the twentieth century. I presented a
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quantitative theory of this phenomenon. In the model children yield utils, but they require
time to be raised. The war is tantamount to an income shock, both contemporaneous and
expected. I calibrated the model to the time series of pre-war fertility. I found that the war
triggered a large negative response of fertility, accounting for 91% of the observed decline.
The model also features a mechanism to account for the post-war rebound in fertility. Its
calibrated version overpredicts this rebound by 4%.
The key determinant of these results is the loss of expected income associated with the risk
that a wife remains alone after the war. Even though the war also features shocks to wages
for both husband and wives, these other forces oset each others.
Although the analysis that I presented is about France during the First World War, neither
France nor World War I are unique cases. As is clear from Figure 1 other belligerents of
the war experienced the same fate as France. Furthermore, there is evidence, presented by
Caldwell (2004), that fertility declined in many countries during various episodes of wars,
civil wars, revolutions and dictatorships {see Table 1. The conclusions that I reach in this
analysis could be extended to these episodes in future research.
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Table 1: Changes in Fertility for Countries Experiencing Major Social Upheavals
Country Episode Period Change in CBR (%)
England Civil War, Commonwealth,
and early Restoration 1641-66  17:3
France Revolution 1787-1804  22:5
USA Civil War 1860-70  12:8
Russia WWI and Revolution 1913-21  24:4
Germany War, revolution, defeat, ination 1913-1924  26:1
Austria War, defeat, empire dismembered 1913-24  26:9
Spain Civil war and dictatorship 1935-42  21:4
Germany War, defeat, occupation 1938-50  17:3
Japan War, defeat, occupation 1940-55  34:0
Chile Military coup and dictatorship 1972-78  22:3
Portugal Revolution 1973-85  33:3
Spain Dictatorship to democracy 1976-85  37:2
Eastern Europe Communism to capitalism 1986-98
Russia  56:0
Poland  40:0
Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic)  38:0
Source: Caldwell (2004, Table 1).
Note: CBR stands for Crude Birth Rate. Caldwell reports that when fertility was already experiencing a
declining trend, the reductions observed during the periods of unrest are signicantly more pronounced than
before and after. For example, the Spanish birth rate fell as much during the Civil War (1935-42) than
during the 35 years before.
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Table 2: Calibration
Preferences  = 1:04 5,  = 0:216,  = 0:644,  = 0:815
Wages wm = 1; wf = 0:6 for initial (1806) generation
g = 1:0165
Cost of children  = 1:01
Adult equivalent scale (n;m) = 1=2 +m=2 + 0:3n
Demography J = 7,  = 0:805
Table 3: Changes in Fertility, %
q = 1 q = 0:9 q = 0:8
1911-16 1916-21 1911-16 1916-21 1911-16 1916-21
Data  49 +118  49 +118  49 +118
Baseline Experiment  45 +123  45 +126  46 +129
Baseline/data 0:91 1:04 0:92 1:07 0:93 1:09
Counterfactual
Experiments:
1 { war with only p  45 +97  45 +99  45 +100
Exp. 1/Baseline 1:00 0:79 1:00 0:79 0:99 0:78
2 { war with only m  19 +28  19 +27  19 +27
Exp. 2/Baseline 0:42 0:23 0:41 0:22 0:41 0:21
3 { war with only f +12  5 +13  5 +13  5
Exp. 3/Baseline  0:28  0:04  0:28  0:04  0:28  0:04
4 { war with only gpost war +4  10 +3  9 +3  8
Exp. 4/Baseline  0:08  0:09  0:07  0:07  0:06  0:06
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Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis: Changes in Fertility During and After the War when
q1916(war) = 0, Model and French Data, %
1911-16 1916-21
Data  49 +118
Baseline  45 +123
p = 0:10  33 +80
p = 0:20  49 +144
m = 0:25  42 +110
m = 0:75  53 +165
Time cost of children 5%  20 +31
Time cost of children 15%  40 +95
wf=wm = 0:65  38 +84
wf=wm = 0:55  43 +99
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Figure 1: Birth Rates in Some European Countries
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Source: Mitchell (1998).
Figure 2: Number of Births per Month in France and Germany
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Note: The source of data is Bunle (1954, Table XI). The linear trends are estimated using the data from
January 1906 until July 1914. The area between the two vertical lines runs from May 1915, that is 9 months
after the declaration of war between France and Germany in August 1914, until August 1919 that is 9
months after the armistice was signed in November 1918.
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Figure 3: Completed Fertility in France
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Source: Insee, etat civil et recensement de population.
Completed fertility is the average number of children born to a woman of a particular cohort, once she has
reached age 50.
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Figure 4: French Population by Age and Sex, January 1, Selected Years
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Source: Insee, etat civil et recensement de population.
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Figure 5: Population by Age and Sex, Selected Countries, 1950
4000 3000 2000 1000 0
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
Male
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
0 − 4
5 − 9
10 − 14
15 − 19
20 − 24
25 − 29
30 − 34
35 − 39
40 − 44
45 − 49
50 − 54
55 − 59
60 − 64
65 − 69
70 − 74
75 − 79
80 +
Age in 1950
Female
400 300 200 100 0
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
Male
0 100 200 300 400
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
0 − 4
5 − 9
10 − 14
15 − 19
20 − 24
25 − 29
30 − 34
35 − 39
40 − 44
45 − 49
50 − 54
55 − 59
60 − 64
65 − 69
70 − 74
75 − 79
80 +
Age in 1950
Female
Germany Belgium
3000 2000 1000 0
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
Male
0 1000 2000 3000
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
0 − 4
5 − 9
10 − 14
15 − 19
20 − 24
25 − 29
30 − 34
35 − 39
40 − 44
45 − 49
50 − 54
55 − 59
60 − 64
65 − 69
70 − 74
75 − 79
80 +
Age in 1950
Female
3000 2000 1000 0
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
Male
0 1000 2000 3000
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
0 − 4
5 − 9
10 − 14
15 − 19
20 − 24
25 − 29
30 − 34
35 − 39
40 − 44
45 − 49
50 − 54
55 − 59
60 − 64
65 − 69
70 − 74
75 − 79
80 +
Age in 1950
Female
United Kingdom Italy
30000 20000 10000 0
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
Male
0 10000 20000 30000
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
0 − 4
5 − 9
10 − 14
15 − 19
20 − 24
25 − 29
30 − 34
35 − 39
40 − 44
45 − 49
50 − 54
55 − 59
60 − 64
65 − 69
70 − 74
75 − 79
80 +
Age in 1950
Female
9000 6000 3000 0
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
Male
0 3000 6000 9000
1946−50
1941−45
1936−40
1931−35
1926−30
1921−25
1916−20
1911−15
1906−10
1901−05
1896−00
1891−95
1886−90
1881−85
1876−80
1871−75
1866−70
1,000 population
Year of birth
 
 
0 − 4
5 − 9
10 − 14
15 − 19
20 − 24
25 − 29
30 − 34
35 − 39
40 − 44
45 − 49
50 − 54
55 − 59
60 − 64
65 − 69
70 − 74
75 − 79
80 +
Age in 1950
Female
Europe United States
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Aairs, Population Division.
31
Figure 6: Average and Median Age of Women Giving Birth in France
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Source: Insee, etat civil et recensement de population.
Figure 7: Proportion of Out-of-Wedlock Live Births in France
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Source: Insee, etat civil et recensement de population.
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Figure 8: The Contemporaneous Decline in Fertility Caused by a War
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Note: In a war consumption is low, increasing the marginal cost of children.
Figure 9: The Post-war Catch-up in Fertility
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Note: After a war, the stock of children is low, increasing the marginal utility of children.
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Figure 10: Index of Output per Worker in France, 1896{1935
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The data is from CEPII. It is available upon request or at can be downloaded at:
http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/villa/serlongues/crois.xls
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Figure 11: Fertility Rate in France
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Figure 12: Fertility Rate in France, Baseline Experiment (q = 1)
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Figure 13: Age-Specic Fertility for 2-Adult Households (q = 1)
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Figure 14: Lifetime Fertility (q = 1)
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Figure 15: Fertility Rate in France, Counterfactual Experiments (q = 1)
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